Just how useful to terrorists is geographic data on the Web?

You may recall the wholesale pulling of information from the Web after 9/11. It was a remarkable example of institutional fear, simple-mindedness and the politically-sensitive bureaucrat's instinct for cosmetic solutions over meaningful ones. The RAND Corporation took an in-depth look at the dangers of putting geographic data on the Web and found that it posed little risk at all. The 2004 report, which I just came across, is called "Mapping the Risks: Assessing the Homeland Security Implications of Publicly Available Geospatial Information" (PDF):

Our analysis found that very few of the publicly accessible federal geospatial sources appear useful to meeting a potential attacker’s information needs. Fewer than 6 percent of the 629 federal geospatial information datasets we examined appeared as though they could be useful to a potential attacker. Further, we found no publicly available federal geospatial datasets that we considered critical to meeting the attacker’s information needs (i.e., those that the attacker could not perform the attack without).

Our analysis suggests that most publicly accessible federal geospatial information is unlikely to provide significant (i.e., useful and unique) information for satisfying attackers’ information needs. Fewer than 1 percent of the 629 federal datasets we examined appeared both potentially useful and unique. Moreover, since the September 11 attacks, these information sources are no longer being made public by federal agencies. However, we cannot conclude that publicly accessible federal geospatial information provides no special benefit to the attacker. Neither can we conclude that it would benefit the attacker. Our sample suggests that the information, if it exists, is not distributed widely and may be scarce.

In many cases, diverse alternative geospatial and nongeospatial information sources exist for meeting the information needs of potential attackers. In our sampling of more than 300 publicly available nonfederal geospatial information alternative sources, we found that the same, similar, or more useful geospatial information on U.S. critical sites is available from a diverse set of nonfederal sources. These sources include industry and commercial businesses, academic institutions, NGOs, state and local governments, international sources, and even private citizens who publish relevant materials on the World Wide Web. Some geospatial data and information that these nonfederal sources distribute are derived from federal sources that are publicly accessible. Similarly, these nonfederal organizations are increasingly becoming sources of geospatial data and information for various federal agencies (see Chapter Three for additional discussion). In addition, relevant information is often obtainable via direct access or direct observation of the U.S. critical site.

Incidentally, appendix B of the report gives a very comprehensive list of federal geospatial data sources on the Web, including the URLs. Just don't tell bin Laden.

(via The FOI Advocate)